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Summary and Recommendations 
Abstract 
Within the EU’s approach to crisis management, it is crucial to consider the point of view of all 
stakeholders to ensure that the crisis response is in line with European commitments towards local 
ownership and conflict sensitivity. This EUNPACK Policy Brief discusses the perceptions of those who 
have been exposed to the EU’s responses to the crisis unfolding in Libya. It is based on the results 
of a survey completed in the summer of 2017 by 228 respondents. It highlights, on the one hand, 
that while the EU is the most widely-known international actor involved in crisis response in Libya, 
the impact of its initiatives is less visible, thereby prompting a certain degree of dissatisfaction, if 
not of scepticism. This reaction is particularly pronounced remarkable among ethnic minorities living 
in peripheral regions. On the other hand, the EU is particularly praised for its initiatives in the fields 
of humanitarian assistance and capacity building, targeting most notably the most vulnerable social 
groups. To make sure that the EU’s crisis response in Libya achieves the highest degree of conflict 
sensitivity, appropriateness and effectiveness, the EU should: 
1. Pay greater attention to security sector reform (SSR) as a pillar of crisis response in Libya. 
2. Avoid undermining the positive image of the EU’s humanitarian commitment by engaging in 
contradictory policies. 
3. Ensure that crisis-response initiatives are coherent with the needs of all Libyan social groups, 
including ethnic minorities. 
4. Improve the monitoring and evaluation of its crisis response towards achieving its stated goals. 
5. Invest more resources in conflict-sensitive crisis response.  
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Introduction 
Context 
Libya has faced intense political and security turmoil for several years and, at the time of writing, is far 
from achieving any semblance of stability. Many international actors, including individual foreign 
countries and international organisations, have intervened in Libya in an effort to help bring a response 
to (their respective framings of) the ongoing crisis. Uncontestably, the European Union (EU) is among 
the most prominent to offer help, because of the significance of its political commitment and the 
magnitude of resources allocated as part of its crisis response initiatives in Libya. A previous paper 
prepared within this research project (Ivashchenko et al., 2017) provides an in-depth description of 
the EU’s framing of the crisis in Libya, the strategic objectives of the EU’s initiatives and the specific 
crisis response mechanisms and policy tools progressively adopted by the different EU institutions to 
pursue these ends. Building on these research results, a forthcoming EUNPACK Working Paper will 
discuss the outcome and impact of these measures. The present paper explores the perceptions that 
have accompanied EU crisis-response initiatives in Libya. In light of the EU’s commitment to conflict 
sensitivity and local ownership, in fact, providing a bottom-up analysis of how EU’s crisis response is 
received and perceived by different local actors throughout the conflict is a crucial component of the 
evaluation of the EU’s crisis response initiatives. The data presented in this study are largely based on 
an exploratory survey of security perceptions in Libya carried out between July and September of 2017.  
Methodology 
Libya represents a very challenging research environment, and even more so when security-related 
topics are investigated. Given the volatile situation across most of the country, opportunities to engage 
in sustained fieldwork are severely constrained. And even if one were willing to take the risk, field 
research is increasingly regulated by a number of safety and security protocols to ensure compliance 
with research institutions’ duty of care (Peter and Strazzari, 2016). Collaborative research projects such 
as EUNPACK raise further issues, as the room for manoeuvre granted by different institutions is 
influenced by changing – and sometimes contradictory – definitions of security and risk. As a result, 
authorisation to carry out field research in North Africa, and most notably in Libya, is particularly hard 
to obtain.1  
Moreover, past memories and present tensions exercise a twofold influence on the research dynamics. 
Firstly, Libyans – who in many cases have lived for decades under an authoritarian regime – are 
sometimes suspicious of a foreigner’s affiliation with a national or an international state-sponsored 
institution. Secondly, the local population may still associate interviewing and surveys with a form of 
political control, and tend to be wary of sharing personal data and opinions with individuals trying to 
establish contact from afar. This has some relevant implications as closed-data survey research may 
lack the instruments to foster mutual trust between researcher and interviewees. Some of the most 
well-established research institutions conducting surveys in Africa have capitulated to these obstacles, 
and have abandoned their efforts to collect data and write reports on Libya (such as Afrobarometer), 
                                                          
1 These observations are confirmed in the course of several informal exchanges with other scholars from different 
universities who work on Libya. 
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or have stopped doing so since 2013 (such as Gallup), before the security situation worsened 
significantly. It is hardly surprising, then, that there is a dearth of up-to-date polls and surveys on 
Libyans, with Libyans and about Libyans, and not only about security matters. One has to go several 
years back in time to find a serious security perception survey in/on Libya (see, for instance Small Arms 
Survey, 2014), when discussions about foreign actors’ crisis response interventions were yet to come, 
or look at the surveys conducted in Tunisia among Libyans who were forced to leave their country.2 
With a view to circumventing these obstacles, this Policy Brief has built a new dataset trying to combine 
creativity with realism. In order to foster cross-case comparability among different cases within 
EUNPACK, our survey has targeted individuals with “a certain degree of exposure” to EU crisis response 
initiatives in Libya, including beneficiaries, potential beneficiaries and implementers. Given the 
constraints of field access, we have focused on national and international civil society networks (of the 
kind described by Keck and Sikkink 1998), whose articulations by definition criss-cross and transcend 
Libya. Moreover, civil society represents a relatively persistent target of EU crisis response in spite of 
rapidly changing beneficiaries across the years. To identify and map these actors, we have relied on a 
number of different sources, including the review of both the scholarly and policy literature on the 
topic, the institutional expertise and regional outreach of the project partners, and the reliance the 
personal networks that the authors have developed over years of fieldwork. While in many cases the 
initial informants were outside Libya, further snowballing has helped to locate ‘hidden’ sub-networks 
within Libya, thereby ensuring a more fine-tuned degree of coverage. Moreover, by leveraging 
common acquaintances, the snowballing sampling technique has reduced the methodological and 
ethical challenges of the free flow of information. At the same time, the very diverse set of initial 
informants has contributed to compensating for the potential issues of community bias and ‘wrong 
anchoring’.  
Aiming to cope with security constraints on the ground, access to the respondents was ensured by a 
number of different techniques. Face-to-face direct interviews have been carried out with targets 
residing in (or provisionally moving to) Tunisia, as well as in Italy and Libya. To this end, the two 
principal investigators were flanked by two local interviewers, one based in Tripoli and one in Tunis. In 
some cases, questionnaires have been supplied intermediaries trusted by both the interviewers and 
the research targets to ensure a greater degree of confidentiality.3 Access to the respondents was 
ensured also by resorting to remote interviews (via Skype, telegram, etc.), and the supply of self-
administered questionnaires (i.e. filled out by the respondent) via email (either directly or via 
undisclosed mailing lists of target groups).4 By alleviating potential positional biases, the reliance on 
‘proxy interviewing’ (Cammett, 2013) – including local interviewers and intermediaries – has allowed 
                                                          
2 In 2015 and 2016, IRMC (Institut de recherche sur le Maghreb contemporain) in Tunis supported research on 
the topics of Libyan migration and diaspora in Tunisia. 
3 Local interviewers and civil society intermediaries have received from the principal investigators fundamental 
training on the purpose of the research, its theoretical framing, conceptual issues and ethical standards. 
4 Given the remote nature of many interactions with the questionnaires’ respondents, oral consent procedures 
have replaced the written forms of fully informed consent, in line with the highest ethical standards of the 
discipline (Wood, 2006). After all, oral consent represents an established practice within leading academic 
institutions such as the University of California-Berkeley, Stanford University and New York University. This is 
also in line with standard methodologies adopted by the local partner IRMC. 
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us to circumvent the security, linguistic and cultural obstacles that may have otherwise barred access 
to the questionnaire targets to outsiders, and namely to foreign security scholars.  
Sample  
The data presented in this Policy Brief rely on the responses received to 228 valid questionnaires 
completed by targeted individuals identified and joined reached as discussed above. Such a sample is 
obviously too limited to be statistically significant. Moreover, the short time-frame of the survey does 
not capture potential variations in respondents’ perceptions that might have occurred since the 
beginning of the crisis. As a result, this paper does not aspire to offer an exhaustive overview of very 
complex issues, nor an estimate of general validity, but rather a snapshot providing insights into how 
the EU crisis response in Libya is currently perceived. Even a modest amount of data might still be 
better than no data as it could allow a sober assessment of the findings introduced here, which could 
orient future research projects by providing a preliminary baseline.  
The profiles of the surveyed population mirror quite accurately some of the defining features of the 
Libyan population: the largest majority of the respondents are Libyan nationals (90.4%)5 and define 
themselves as Sunni Muslims (90%).6 In line with the country’s high social standards (as compared to 
the rest of the region), less than a quarter of the respondents claim to be able to satisfy their basic 
needs only sometimes (17%),7 never or rarely (7.4% combined), while, when asked about their social 
status, 82.4% of them rank themselves average or higher. Some 91.3% of the respondents have spent 
at least 12 years in formal schooling, and only a small minority acknowledges having difficulties in 
reading (10.5%) or writing (8.4%). In terms of gender balance, the sample includes only 29.4% of 
women: while this is obviously not representative of Libya’s gender proportions in absolute terms, it 
is likely to reflect the actual rates of the gender (im)balance in the public sphere, including within civil 
society. Some 49% of the respondents are adults (26-36 years old), one-third (32%) is ‘mature’ (40 or 
older), while youth (18-25 years old) account for 18.4%.  
Slightly less than two-thirds (62.7%) of the respondents live in Tripolitania, and considerably less in the 
other historic regions of Libya, including 11.4% in Cyrenaica and 11% in Fezzan. Moreover, 8% of the 
respondents live out of Libya, including 5.7% in Tunisia. While Tripolitania is the most populated region 
of Libya, it makes little doubt that these figures mirror more the accessibility of the population than its 
actual regional distribution. In terms of self-identified ethnic belonging, the surveyed individuals 
include 70% of Arabs, 12.3% of Tuaregs, 7% of Amazigh/Berber, 2% Tawergha and 0.4% Tebu.8 In total, 
                                                          
5 Those who are not Libyan nationals include sub-Saharan African migrants present in Libya (3% of the sample) 
and foreign workers involved in different capacities in crisis response initiatives dealing with Libya, the majority 
of whom are Tunisians (1.7%) and Italians (1.7%). 
6 Most of those who do not define themselves as Sunni Muslim simply refused to identify with any other specific 
religious affiliation, thereby making religious minorities negligible within our sample. 
7 For the sake of clarity and simplicity, all decimals .1, .2, .8 and .9 have been rounded off to the most proximate 
unit. 
8 This categorisation is admittedly contentious. The Tuaregs are often seen as a sub-group of the Amazigh/Berber, 
just as much as the Tawergha can be considered as one of the many families within the Arab community. Gaddafi-
era policies of nationality have complicated things further, and many Tebu have been denied either their ethnic 
recognition or their national status. It is also due to the sensitivity of ethnic labelling that a considerable fraction 
of respondents (8%) has refused to answer this question straightforwardly. In terms of quantitative proportions, 
however, these figures mirror rather accurately the reported dimensions of Libya’s different ethnic groups. 
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about a half (48%) of the sample declares to be professionally involved in crisis response initiatives in 
Libya, the majority of whom are ethnic Arabs (52%) and reside in Tripolitania (51.7%).  
Figure 1. Basic characteristics of the survey respondents 
 
 
 
                                                          
Although Tawergha and Tuaregs are probably over-represented, the overall proportions of the Arab+Tawergha 
and of the Amazigh/Berber+Tuaregs seem reasonable (see Kohl, 2014). In the subsequent discussion, potential 
correlations involving the Tawergha or the Tebu will be dismissed, because the small size of the sample makes 
them highly subject to statistical error.  
Region of residence
Tripolitania - West
Cyrenaica - East
Fezzan - South
Foreign - Tunisia
Foreign - else
NA
Ethnic affiliation
Arab
Berber/Amazigh
Tawergha
Tebu
Tuareg
DK
NA
Are you and your family able to satisfy your 
basic needs?
Yes
Most of the times
Sometimes
Rarely
Never
DK
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Main findings 
Awareness of EU crisis response 
Of the surveyed population, the vast majority (97%) is aware that international actors are involved in 
crisis response in Libya.9 The EU is by far the most well-known actor: 93% of the surveyed population 
is aware of its involvement in crisis-response initiatives in Libya, far more than is aware of any other 
national or international organisation. For instance, the aggregate level of awareness drops at 72.4% 
for UN agencies (including UNHCR, WFP, IOM, WHO) and at 55.7% for the UN Support Mission in Libya 
(UNSMIL, the ongoing UN peace-keeping operation in Libya). The highest-ranking individual countries, 
whose involvement in crisis response Libyans are aware of, include Italy (64.3%) and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) 50.7%). No other actor has been mentioned by at least half of the surveyed population.  
The majority of the respondents seem to be aware of the EU’s crisis response in three main fields of 
intervention: humanitarian action; capacity building; and policy initiatives and diplomacy. Conversely, 
another three fields of intervention are known by less than half of the sample: development aid; 
security sector reform (SSR); and rule of law. In particular, the most visible field of EU crisis response 
is the humanitarian action (74.2%), and the least visible is the rule of law (20.4%). The perceived 
beneficiaries of EU intervention mirror the visibility of these fields: vulnerable groups – potentially 
entitled to humanitarian aid – are the best-known beneficiaries of EU support, including most notably 
civil society organisations (mentioned by 58% of the respondents),10 migrants, refugees and internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) (mentioned in 56.6% of the cases in aggregate terms) and women (45.7%). 
Conversely, potential beneficiaries of SSR support are less frequently mentioned, including the military 
(identified as the target of EU support by 12.7% of respondents), the police and other security forces 
(mentioned in 16.7% of the cases in aggregate terms). Interestingly enough, and probably as an 
illustration of Libya’s fragmented security environment, non-state armed actors (such as militias and 
armed groups) rank higher (19.5%) than formal security forces in the respondents’ perceptions of the 
beneficiaries of EU support. Halfway between the high visibility of vulnerable groups and the low 
visibility of armed actors, one finds different sorts of public officials as perceived beneficiaries of EU 
crisis-response initiatives, including urban communities and their authorities (shura councils, 
municipalities, etc.) (39%), state officials and bureaucracies (35%), political elites (MPs, party leaders, 
etc.) (32%), and rural communities and their authorities (26%). 
The aggregate results about the awareness of EU crisis response initiatives in Libya display some 
interesting variations, depending on the respondents’ ethic affiliation, regional origin and social status. 
The levels of awareness of the self-identified ethnic Tuareg diverge sharply from the average: only 56% 
of them mention the EU as a prominent actor in crisis response in Libya; 32% mention the different UN 
agencies combined; and 24% UNMSIL. Conversely, awareness of the crisis-response initiatives by 
individual states is higher among ethnic minorities than on average: 80% of the Tawergha and 80% of 
the Tuaregs are aware of the crisis-response initiatives taken by Egypt, UAE and Qatar; even more 
                                                          
9 Only the respondents who claimed to be aware of international interventions of crisis response in Libya were 
given the opportunity to answer the subsequent questions. As a result, the analysis that follows is based upon 
this more limited sample (221 surveys out of 228). 
10 As the majority of the sample is composed of members of civil society organisations, this score can be biased. 
However, respondents were given the possibility to select multiple answers to this question. 
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strikingly, Italy is mentioned by 88% of the Tuaregs and 78.6% of the Amazigh/Berber. Interestingly, 
the recognition of the crisis-response initiatives by Egypt and the UAE is much lower among the 
respondents from Libya’s eastern coastal region of Cyrenaica (19%) than from anywhere else. In 
general, one notices that the respondents’ awareness of the involvement of different actors in crisis-
response initiatives decreases with their social status, although the knowledge gap about individual 
countries is less marked. The same factor influences the respondents’ perceptions of the main fields 
of EU crisis-response interventions, in combination also with the distance from decision-making 
centres. Not so surprisingly, the less well-known fields of EU crisis response – such as security sector 
reform and rule of law – feature higher-than-average levels of awareness among the Tunis-based 
respondents, where aid professionals and experts are more concentrated, while they are almost 
completely unknown among the less-wealthy social strata.  
Similarly, but more surprisingly, the awareness about the humanitarian action of the EU is much more 
pronounced among those who are systematically able to satisfy their basic needs (83%), than among 
those who can rarely do so (50%) – and who would theoretically be more entitled to such aid. For 
instance, the awareness about the most visible fields of EU intervention – such as humanitarian action 
and capacity building – among marginalised communities such as the Tuaregs is less than half of the 
aggregate average. Among the Tuaregs, the visibility of EU aid recipients, too, is generally less than 
half the average, including for both the most and the least widely recognised beneficiaries 
(respectively: civil society, migrants and women, on the one hand; and different security forces, on the 
other).  
Figure 2. Awareness of crisis-response actors and the purpose of their interventions 
 
0
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8 │ Perceptions about the EU’s Crisis Response in Libya 
 
 
Satisfaction with EU crisis response 
The degree of satisfaction with the EU crisis interventions in Libya varies from one respondent to 
another and does not allow for a straightforward assessment. In general, those who hold a very 
negative opinion of the EU crisis response in Libya form an unambiguous minority: only 14.5% of the 
respondents consider that the European intervention aggravated the crisis, and 15.4% claim to be 
“worse off” as a result of EU crisis response undertakings. However, those who have the opposite view 
are far from being the absolute majority: EU crisis intervention helped to alleviate the crisis according 
to 37.6% of the sample, while 30.3% thought they were “better off” as a result of it. A considerable 
amount of respondents seems quite sceptical about the impact of the EU’s crisis response: 29% 
consider that it had no appreciable effect, and 38.5% claim that it did not affect their personal 
situation. The disaggregation of the data reveals considerable variations of the satisfaction rates. Once 
more, the Tuaregs’ perceptions are particularly negative: only 12% of the Tuareg respondents consider 
that the EU intervention helped to alleviate the crisis (against an aggregate average of 37.6%), while 
36% of them felt that it aggravated the crisis (against 14.5% on average). In Cyrenaica, only 7.7% of the 
respondents (against 30.3% on average) felt they were “better off” as a result of the EU’s crisis 
response, while about two-thirds of them (65.4%) responded that EU had no appreciable impact and 
felt “about the same”. 
The respondents are generally more satisfied with EU crisis-response initiatives in the sectors they are 
most aware of. However, the same ambiguity remains: in no case do those who find EU action 
satisfying or very satisfying (combined) constitute the absolute majority: 43% in the field of 
humanitarian action, 45.7% in the field of capacity building (with a considerable 17.6% of respondents 
claiming to be “very satisfied”), and 27.6% in the field of policy initiatives and diplomacy. The 
respondents who are dissatisfied (“not so satisfied” and “not at all satisfied” answers combined) with 
EU crisis interventions are steadier, and oscillate between 30% and 40% across all fields. Humanitarian 
action and capacity building are the only fields in which those who are globally satisfied exceed those 
who are dissatisfied, while in the fields of rule of law and SSR those who are dissatisfied (33.5% and 
41%, respectively) are more than twice as many of those who find the EU’s intervention satisfactory 
(12.7% and 16%, respectively). Again, the disaggregation of this data reveals considerable fluctuations 
across different sub-groups within the sample. The less wealthy among the respondents tend to be 
less satisfied than on average with EU interventions in the fields of humanitarian action and policy 
0
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initiatives and diplomacy. Another remarkable divergence emerged from the responses from residents 
of Cyrenaica, who tend to be particularly satisfied with EU humanitarian action (54% of them consider 
it satisfying or very satisfying), but less satisfied with EU capacity-building interventions (31%). In this 
last field, the respondents based in Tunisia indicated very high levels of satisfaction (69.3%).  
Another source of ambiguity is the perception about the conflict sensitivity of the EU’s crisis response. 
Some 40.3% of the respondents consider the EU’s crisis response to be conflict sensitive, and 37% 
don’t. The disaggregation of this data further illustrates the trends observed above, in which 
marginalised populations feature a less optimistic view: among ethnic minorities, only 28.6% of the 
Amazigh/Berber and 8% of the Tuaregs esteem EU crisis intervention to be conflict sensitive. This is in 
contrast with the views of the respondents based in Tunisia, 61.5% of whom esteem EU intervention 
to be conflict sensitive. The most remarkable data come from respondents from abroad, and notably 
Western countries, where 60% esteem that EU is not conflict sensitive. 
Figure 3. Levels of satisfaction with the EU’s crisis response, by area of intervention 
 
Personal experience with the EU’s crisis response 
This section illustrates the respondents’ personal experience with the EU crisis response. The analysis 
is based on the responses from individuals who have personally benefitted from programmes, projects 
and initiatives undertaken in the framework of an EU crisis response. These include about one-third 
(35%) of the sample. The largest majority of them are based in Tripolitania, while only 5% of the 
respondents are based in Fezzan and 1.3% in Cyrenaica. The majority are self-identified ethnic Arab 
(75.3%), followed by Amazigh/Berber and Tawargha minority (6.5%) and Tuareg (5.2%). 
Among the beneficiaries of EU support, one finds a high representation of the less-affluent strata of 
the society, including the majority of the respondents who claim to be able to satisfy their basic needs 
only rarely, or never (although, in absolute terms, the majority of the beneficiaries are among the more 
affluent strata of the society, thereby mirroring the overall proportions of the sample, and of the 
Libyan population in general). The beneficiaries among the respondents have received EU support 
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most frequently in the fields of capacity building (72%), development aid (31%) and humanitarian 
assistance (27%), and only very seldom in the fields of diplomacy (4%), rule of law (4%) or SSR (1.3%). 
The disaggregation of data shows interesting divergences: the beneficiaries of capacity-building 
programmes include a remarkable 100% of the Amazigh/Berber respondents of the sample, while 75% 
of the Tuareg respondents have benefitted from EU-sponsored humanitarian assistance. 
The largest majority of the self-identified beneficiaries (80.5%) claims to be satisfied overall with the 
assistance received, with no noticeable variation based on ethnic affiliation, regional origin or social 
status. EU support is praised in particular for targeting the right needs (agreed by 58.4% of aid 
recipients) and the right type of recipients (as only 28.6% of aid recipients consider the EU’s 
intervention misplaced). However, the beneficiaries’ assessments of the quantitative allocations of EU 
aid are less favourable: the views of those who consider the magnitude of European crisis intervention 
too low (44%) are about the same as those who find it sufficient (35%) or generous (9%). The 
proportion of negative views about the generosity of the EU’s crisis response initiatives is 
comparatively even larger among ethnic minorities, such as the Tuaregs and the Berber/Amazigh, as 
well as – quite surprisingly – among the Libyan ‘middle-class’, who claim to be able to satisfy their basic 
needs “sometimes” or “most of the times”.  
Observations and conclusions 
In spite of the limited size of the sample, the data presented above provide useful insights that permit 
us to sketch some interesting trends. The European Union is by far the best-known actor engaged in 
crisis response in Libya, not only among UN agencies and missions, but also individual countries with 
a well-known engagement in Libya, such as Italy, UAE or others. The degree of satisfaction with the 
EU’s crisis response, however, is far less straightforward. While few expressed strongly negative 
perceptions, many respondents seem to consider the EU’s crisis response as little impactful, which 
may explain a significant degree of ambiguity in the respondents’ overall assessment of the EU’s crisis 
response. The EU crisis response is particularly well known – and generally commended – for its 
contribution in the fields of humanitarian action and capacity-building. Security sector reform, 
however, is regarded as the most problematic area of European engagement: it is not very visible nor 
sufficiently connected to local actors, thereby prompting a generalised dissatisfaction. In view of the 
fragility of Libya’s security environment, it would be advisable for the EU to devote more resources 
and more attention in this field. 
The degree of awareness and satisfaction about EU crisis initiatives tends to show a parallel dynamic. 
EU actions are better known and appreciated in the proximity of decision-making centres, such as 
Tripolitania and Tunis. Conversely, the generalised level of dissatisfaction of social groups suffering 
from ethnic, geographical and social segregation, such as notably the Tuaregs, is alarmingly high and 
demands prompt action. Similarly, the respondents’ views diverge sharply about the conflict sensitivity 
of shown in the EU’s crisis response: this is recognised and praised in Tunisia and in Tripolitania, while 
the ethnic minorities in Libya largely dismiss this view. In Cyrenaica, the EU’s crisis response is not 
deeply rooted, but its humanitarian action, most notably on behalf of migrants, IDPs and refugees, is 
highly valued and has earned the EU a greater visibility in the field of crisis response than that of foreign 
actors with a traditionally stronger local rooting, such as Egypt or the United Arab Emirates. Building 
on these observations, the EU is advised to improve its capacity to design, implement and 
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communicate crisis-response initiatives that are coherent with the needs of a broader set of 
stakeholders than those who reside in capital cities.  
The direct beneficiaries of EU crisis response initiatives are largely satisfied with the support received. 
In their view, EU aid is targeting the right needs and the right recipients. Interestingly, in fact, very few 
respondents claimed that EU initiatives are biased or that the EU is not supporting the right 
stakeholders. However, the quantitative size of EU aid allocations raises concerns. While opportunistic 
motives may obviously explain these answers, such views are compatible with the assessment – largely 
shared among all respondents – of the limited impact of the EU’s crisis response. And indeed, the 
monetary value of EU-sponsored initiatives in Libya is comparatively lower than in many other crisis-
torn countries. These observations may suggest the need for more accurate planning and a more 
realistic allocation of resources to make sure that European crisis response in Libya is appropriate, 
efficient and effective. However, considerations of conflict sensitivity should temper the disbursement 
of any additional funding. These observations lead us to formulate the following recommendations 
directed to the attention of EU policymakers: 
1. Pay greater attention to the security sector reform, not least by making it clear how the EU is 
planning to support Libyan authorities and all stakeholders to build a centralised and accountable 
security apparatus. This could, incidentally, contribute to the policy initiatives that the EU is also 
promoting in Libya. 
2. Avoid undermining the positive image of EU humanitarian commitment by eschewing initiatives 
that send ambiguous messages, notably in the field of migration policies. 
3. Ensure the full participation of Libyan social groups that are subject to ethnic, geographical and 
social segregation in the design, implementation, evaluation and communication of all EU crisis-
response initiatives; 
4. Engage in more accurate planning and a more balanced allocation of resources to make sure that 
European crisis response pursues realistic objectives in an effective manner, and rigorously 
monitor the progress towards their achievement. 
5. Continue to engage in conflict analysis and collect updated evidence to make sure that all decisions 
related to crisis response are conflict-sensitive. 
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